

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR BADEAU'S LETTER OF  
JANUARY 3, 1964 TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Egypt is the paramount Eastern Arab state and the leader of the nationalist reform movement. Although the drive for Arab unity has slowed, Nasser remains the most widely respected Arab leader. This gives the UAR a significant independent capacity to affect American interests in the area.

2. Our interests are: to blunt Soviet penetration; to preserve Western access to sea and air routes and to Arab oil; and to promote peace and progress in the area.

3. Our policy has featured: extension of economic assistance; even-handedness in area disputes; and readiness to commit our power and prestige to the defense of our interests.

4. The wisdom of these policies has been shown by an increase in American influence at the expense of Soviet influence since 1956. In addition, inter-Arab quarrels have been moderated; the public UAR position on Jordan waters has been moderate, as has their position on recent U.S. support for Israel; the UAR has kept the Israel question in the icebox, and is now considered to be likely to attack Israel only if it believes Israel has begun to produce nuclear weapons. Private U.S. claims are slowly being adjudicated; Western access to the Suez Canal seems assured (barring Arab-Israeli hostilities); and the Egyptians have shown an increasing appreciation of the advantage of closer cooperation with the West.

5. The remaining problems between Cairo and Washington are manageable. Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen has been slow, but they recognize the disengagement principle. There is no present threat to the Saudi Government or to Aden, and there might be chaos in Yemen if the UAR moved out too fast.

6. The UAR remains heavily dependent on Soviet military aid, but Western aid—especially PL 480—has helped preserve nonalignment; the UAR is still hostile to Israel, but leans toward containment. Time may heal even this wound.

7. In conclusion, cessation of U.S. aid to the UAR would not moderate their policies, would nullify the gains since 1956 and jeopardize our interests. The guillotine can only be used once per subject.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. 1, Cables. Secret. Both the summary and the 9-page letter from Badeau are filed with a covering memorandum of January 14 from Rusk to the President; a covering memorandum of January 14 from Komer to Bill Moyers, which noted that the President might want to urge Badeau to stay on during the "ticklish period in US-UAR relations" expected to develop over the Jordan water issue; and an undated note from Moyers to NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, stating that the President had seen the package and that Bundy should talk to him about asking Badeau to stay on.

Washington, April 8, 1964.

MAIN TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD<sup>2</sup>

## The Problem

To estimate general trends in the Arab world over the next several years.

## Conclusions

A. Political turmoil in the Arab world appears likely to continue for many years to come. The military have come to play an increasing role, but—except in Egypt—they have not proved to be a stabilizing factor. Iraq and Syria in particular are likely to remain highly unstable. The monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya will come under increasing revolutionary nationalist pressure, and one or more of them may be extinguished in the next several years. Nasser appears likely to remain the single most influential Arab leader. The noteworthy economic and social progress of the past ten years will continue, although as in the past, it will be uneven and varied. (Paras. 3, 5, 8-10, 16-19)

B. The emotional appeal of Arab unity will remain very strong, but in general the pan-Arab movement is likely to be confined to the kind of cooperation among independent countries that occurred at the Cairo summit meeting in January 1964. (Paras. 20-22)

C. Arab attitudes toward Israel remain basically hostile, but a fair proportion of Arabs have gradually come privately and reluctantly to accept the fact that Israel will exist for many years to come. The Arab-Israeli arms race will cause tensions and could lead to limited or selective hostile action. Other danger points are the Jordan waters problem and the possibility of Israeli military action in the event of a radical political change in Jordan. Nevertheless, the general inhibitions on open warfare would be strong, and a serious rise in tensions could probably be contained by great power pressures. (Paras. 23-26, 29, 30)

D. Arab relations with the West remain heavily influenced by hatred of "imperialism" and by Western support of Israel. The possibility of a sudden deterioration of Western relations with the Arabs over Israel is always present. The Arab nationalists generally will press for termination of Western base rights in the area. While they will also press for a greater share of oil revenues and a greater degree of participation in production, nationalization appears unlikely. (Paras. 31-33, 35)

E. The Soviets probably believe that the tide is running against the West in the Arab world and that they can capitalize on the unsettled political situation and upon various tensions between the Arabs and West. If US-Arab relations should deteriorate sharply, there would probably be a noticeable strengthening of Soviet influence. We do not believe, however, that this would result in one-sided reliance on the Soviets or a more accommodating attitude toward local Communist parties. (Paras. 36-38)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 8. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here.

<sup>2</sup> This estimate does not cover Sudan and the Maghreb. [Footnote in the source text.]

#### 74. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 29, 1964, 12:45 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

U.S.-U.A.R. Relations

##### PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Honorable John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the United Arab Republic

NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs

Ambassador Badeau was received by the President at 12:45 PM for his final call prior to his resignation from government service.

The President opened the conversation by expressing warm appreciation for the Ambassador's fine work in Cairo and regret that he was terminating his service. The Ambassador responded by expressing his own regret that unavoidable personal responsibilities had made his resignation necessary. He had found the post in Cairo challenging and stimulating, and felt that significant progress had been made in furthering American interests in the Arab world as these relate to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador particularly noted the strong support accorded him by the Department of State and the Administration and said that, in whatever progress has been made, this was a chief factor.

The President then inquired as to the current state of American-Egyptian relations. The Ambassador answered that basic relations continued to be good. Throughout his 35 months of service in Cairo, President Nasser had received him frequently, and the dialogue thus developed had proved highly useful, both in setting forth the American viewpoint and in avoiding incipient conflicts. In recent months, however, the Egyptian Government had been somewhat suspicious that the United States might be changing its policy. While no concrete evidence of such a change existed, the pressures of an election year and the fact of a new Administration made policy-making circles in Egypt unusually sensitive to American actions.

The President then asked what course American policy could most profitably take in the future in relation to the United Arab Republic. The Ambassador replied with a brief summary of American relations

with Egypt since the rise of the present revolutionary regime in 1952. During this time, the Ambassador pointed out, the United States had followed four distinct policies toward Egypt. The number and variety of these policies indicated something more than changing administrations in the United States, although such changes were naturally a factor in them. Basically it had been difficult for the United States to define and pursue steadily a single policy toward Egypt because there are certain mutual irritants which periodically push the two nations apart. Twice during the last 12 years Egypt and the United States had approached a major confrontation. The first occasion was in 1955, at the time of Egypt's first arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc. The second resulted from the Suez Canal nationalization, and came to its climax in the landing of American Marines in Lebanon in 1958.

On each occasion it seemed as though both countries were prepared to throw their weight into a major confrontation. However, just as this became imminent both parties stopped, being unwilling to take the final step. In effect, they said: "We cannot do this to each other; let us pick up the pieces and try again."

The Ambassador said that the reason for this lay in the mutual capacity to hurt each other's interests, which both Egypt and the United States possessed. Were Egypt determined to do so it could cause considerable trouble for the United States in areas of the Near East where there are basic American interests—as witness the recent Libyan response to President Nasser's call for the abolition of Wheelus Air Base. Equally the United States had the capacity to hurt Egypt in areas such as Yemen, Syria, and Jordan if she were determined to do so. Neither party possessed as great a capacity to hurt as it professed, but the capacity was sufficiently large to imperil certain basic national interests.

It was this fact that had prevented a major confrontation in the past. The Ambassador believed that it would continue to make a major confrontation unlikely in the future unless the U.A.R. should threaten an American interest of so basic a character that the United States would be willing to risk imperiling its position in adjacent Arab lands. This was to say that American-Egyptian relations might well continue to fluctuate between cordiality and opposition, but always avoiding the final step of major confrontation.

If this analysis was correct, the Ambassador said, it suggested that the two countries should strive to develop an on-going relation similar to that in existence between many countries. This relationship assumed a continuing bond based upon mutual interests but allowed room for direct opposition on specific issues. To illustrate this the Ambassador cited the American-French relationship. At the moment there were several aspects of French policy with which the United States strongly disagreed, i.e., the independent nuclear deterrent, certain attitudes to-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and Badeau and approved by the White House on July 23. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 1:02 to 1:16 p.m. (Ibid.)

ward NATO, opposition to British participation in the Common Market, and policy toward Communist China and Southeast Asia. It could be expected that America would oppose France on all these issues, but neither the United States nor France assumed that such opposition called into question the basic and longstanding Franco-American tie.

The Ambassador suggested that this approach could be taken toward the U.A.R. It was inevitable that both the United States and the U.A.R. would find it necessary to oppose specific policies adopted by the other. Egypt had long opposed American policy toward Israel, while in recent months the United States had been in opposition to U.A.R. policy on foreign bases and the British position in South Arabia. But opposition on such specific issues need not continuously call into question the basic mutual and continuing interests on which a lasting American-Egyptian policy could be built.

During the past three years a good beginning had been made in identifying and supporting these basic and mutual interests. If this support could be continued, the United States might be able to enjoy a reasonable and long-term relation with the U.A.R., yet retain freedom of movement on specific issues.

The President inquired as to whether President Nasser would understand such a sophisticated policy. The Ambassador replied that he thought the chances were reasonably good for its acceptance. During a long and cordial farewell visit with President Nasser on June 7,<sup>2</sup> the Ambassador had advanced this view in detail. After discussing some aspects of it, President Nasser had replied that this was probably "the only possible policy between the two countries." The Ambassador recognized that it would be difficult for some Americans to understand this approach—and even more difficult for some Egyptians. Nevertheless, it was the only alternative to the "off-again, on-again, gone-again" relation which had vexed the two countries during the past 12 years.

In concluding the interview, President Johnson suggested that he might wish to communicate with President Nasser as a result of this talk with Ambassador Badeau. With this, interview closed.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 71 and footnote 4 thereto.

Moscow, May 27, 1967.

Dear Mr. President:

According to information being received by the Soviet Government the State of Israel is actively engaged in military preparations and evidently intends to carry out armed aggression against neighboring Arab states. Under conditions of extreme tension at the borders of Israel with the UAR and Syria, Israeli militant circles are attempting to impose upon their Government, their country and their people an "adventurist" action for the purpose of resolving all problems by military means. There is a danger that these circles may cause an armed conflict, which would be fraught with important consequences for the cause of peace and international security.

We understand that in the situation now taking shape much depends upon the United States and upon you personally, Mr. President, as to whether Israel will undertake such a reckless act. In this respect there cannot be any other view. If there will be no encouragement on the part of the US, then Israel will not dare step over the line.

In your letter of May 22<sup>2</sup> you called upon us to exercise our influence along with yours in the direction of restraint. We are for restraint. We are convinced that no matter how complex the situation in the area along the borders of Israel, Syria and the United Arab Republic may be, measures must be found to prevent this conflict from becoming a military one. The situation is such that, in our opinion, this can be done. A new hotbed of war must not be permitted to develop in the world.

That's why we are in favor of a restraining influence, but, of course, not to the detriment of the lawful interests of the Arab States. Their actions are of a defensive nature. Moreover, it is precisely restraint that

they are exercising and, as we know, they do not want a military conflict.

Of course, if the "adventurist" line should prevail and if arms should be used, this could be the beginning of far-reaching events. Should Israel commit aggression and military operations begin, then we will render aid to those countries that are subjected to aggression.

Neither we, nor you, nor the Arab countries, nor the people of Israel are interested in a conflict. We appeal to you to take all necessary measures to prevent an armed conflict. We, for our part, will also undertake measures in that direction.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin  
*Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the USSR*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, U.S.S.R.—Presidential Correspondence, Secret; Nodis. The source text, a translation transcribed in the Division of Language Services of the Department of State, was sent to Walt Rostow, along with the original letter in Russian, with a covering memorandum of May 31 from Read. The classification appears on the translation but not on the original letter. Soviet Charge Yuri N. Chernyakov gave the letter to Secretary Rusk at 3 p.m. on May 27. After Soviet Country Director Malcolm Toon translated the letter, Rusk told Chernyakov he would transmit it to the President immediately. He told Chernyakov he could inform his government that Rusk regarded the letter as highly important, especially its last paragraph, and that the U.S. Government was making a maximum effort to strain all governments in the crisis area, including Israel. (Ibid., Country File, Middle East Crisis)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 41.

Moscow, June 5, 1967, 7:47 a.m.

Dear Mr. President,

Having received information concerning the military clashes between Israel and the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Government is convinced that the duty of all great powers is to secure the immediate cessation of the military conflict.

The Soviet Government has acted and will act in this direction. We hope that the Government of the United States will also act in the same manner and will exert appropriate influence on the Government of Israel particularly since you have all opportunities of doing so. This is required in the highest interest of peace.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

Washington, June 5, 1967, 8:15 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

Preliminary to President's arrival we are repeating message dispatched earlier from Secretary Rusk for delivery to Foreign Minister Gromyko.<sup>2</sup>

"We are astonished and dismayed by preliminary reports of heavy fighting between Israeli and Egyptian forces. As you know, we have been making the maximum effort to prevent this situation. We were expecting a very high level Egyptian Delegation on Wednesday and we had assurances from the Israelis that they would not initiate hostilities pending further diplomatic efforts. We feel it is very important that the United Nations Security Council succeed in bringing this fighting to an end as quickly as possible and are ready to cooperate with all members of the Council to that end."

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation on the source text states it was transmitted by U.S. Molink at 8:15 a.m., and received by Soviet Molink at 8:33 a.m. It is addressed "To Chairman Kosygin, From The White House." A copy addressed "To Comrade Kosygin, Chairman Council of Ministers, USSR, From President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson" is *ibid.*, Kostov Files, President-Kosygin Correspondence. According to Llewellyn E. Thompson, the U.S. telegraph operators apparently had asked the Moscow operators the proper way to address Kosygin and were told, "Comrade Kosygin." Ambassador Dobrynin, who had been at the Moscow end of the line, told Thompson afterward that he had been quite startled, and that the Russians wondered if the President was making a joke, or making fun of them in some way. Dobrynin, however, told Thompson he guessed what had happened. Memorandum of conversation between Thompson and Nathaniel Davis; *ibid.*, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7, Appendix G)

<sup>2</sup> The message was sent in telegram 208030 to Moscow, June 5 at 5:25 a.m. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Chargé John C. Guthrie reported in telegram 5349 from Moscow, received at 9:34 a.m. and passed to the White House at 9:55 a.m., that he had delivered the message to Gromyko, who said the Soviet Government was convinced that the great powers should do everything to end the fighting, expressed certainty that the United States could exert influence on Israel, and stated that the Soviet Union had done and would do everything possible to facilitate the end of the fighting. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation that a sight translation was made at 8:05 a.m.; the message was received by the President at 8:15 a.m.; a rough translation was made at 8:30 a.m.; and a final, official translation was provided at 10:05 a.m. There is no indication of the transmission time or time of receipt, but a typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 7:47 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 7:59 a.m. According to an English translation attached to the Russian copy of the message, the complete message begins: "The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kosygin, wishes to know whether President Johnson is standing by the machine. I would like to convey to President Johnson the following information." (*Ibid.*)

Tel Aviv, June 5, 1967, 1205Z.

3935. 1. Following message from Prime Minister to the President has just been handed to me for delivery:

"Dear Mr. President: After weeks in which our peril has grown day by day, we are now engaged in repelling the aggression which Nasser has been building up against us. Israel's existence and integrity have been endangered. The provocative troop concentrations in Sinai, now amounting to five infantry and two armored divisions; the placing of more than 900 tanks against our southern frontier; the massing of 400 tanks opposite Elath with the object of sundering the southern Negev from Israel; the illegal blockade in the Straits of Tiran; the insolent defiance of the international and maritime community; the policy of strangling encirclement of which the first stage was the intimidation of Jordan and the most recent—the placing there of Iraqi troops and Egyptian commando regiments, the imminent introduction of MIG 21 aircraft under Iraqi command in Mafrag; Nasser's announcement of 'total war against Israel' and of his basic aim to annihilate Israel; the order of the day by the Egyptian Commander General Murtagi calling on his troops in Sinai to wage a war of destruction against Israel; the acts of sabotage and terrorism from Syria and Gaza; the recent air encroachments culminating in this morning's engagements and the bombardment by Egypt of Kisufim, Nahal Oz and Tsur Maon in Israel territory—all of this amounts to an extraordinary catalogue of aggression, abhorred and condemned by world opinion and in your great country and amongst all peace loving nations.

As you know, Mr. President, nothing effective had been done or attempted by the UN against a ruthless design to destroy the state of Israel which embodies the memories, sacrifices and hopes of an ancient

murdered in a tragedy without parallel in history.

Mr. President, I am grateful for the friendship expressed in your letters; for your appreciation of our steadfastness and calm; for your policy of protecting the territorial integrity of Israel and other nations; for your undertaking to provide effective American support to preserve the peace and freedom of Israel and the Middle East; and for your undertaking to pursue vigorous measures to keep the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba open as an international waterway to ships of all nations.

These are impressive commitments. Your letter mentions the obstacles which have so far made action difficult. We rely on the courage and determination of our soldiers and citizens. Indeed maximum self-reliance is the central aim of our national revival. My information is that our defense is reaping success. But our trials are not over and we are confident that our small nation can count on the fealty and resolution of its greatest friend.

We seek nothing but peaceful life within our territory, and the exercise of our legitimate maritime rights.

I hope that everything will be done by the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting and enlarging the conflict. The hour of danger can also be an hour of opportunity. It is possible to create conditions favorable to the promotion of peace and the strengthening of forces of freedom in the area.

At this critical moment I should welcome the closest consultation between our governments at all levels.

Israel appeals, Mr. President, to your friendship, your fidelity and your leadership."

Barbour

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 8:44 a.m. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President at 10:40 a.m. with a brief memorandum stating that Eshkol "builds his case mainly on the general environment, but refers to bombardment of three Israeli towns as the trigger." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III) At 11:10 a.m. Rostow sent Johnson telegram 3937 from Tel Aviv, June 5, that reported a meeting among General Amit, Barbour, and Special Counsel to the President Larry C. McPherson, Jr. Rostow's brief covering memorandum commented that Amit's argument was consistent with Eshkol's: that there had been artillery fire on three Israeli villages and UAR air incursions, and then the Israelis had "punched all the buttons." Rostow added, "At least that's his story." (Ibid.) For McPherson's report of his visit to Israel, see Document 263.



Washington, June 5, 1967, 8:57 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin:

I welcome your message. We feel that it is the duty of all great states to secure a speedy end to the military conflict, as indicated in Secretary Rusk's earlier message to Foreign Minister Gromyko this morning. We are strongly supporting action to this end in the United Nations Security Council which meets within the hour and trust you will do the same. I have already made a personal appeal to all the governments in the area concerned and you may be assured we will exercise all our influence to bring hostilities to an end. We are pleased to learn from your message that you are doing the same.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Moscow, June 6, 1967, 5:34 a.m.

Dear Mr. President,

Military activities in the Near East continue, moreover their scope is spreading.

The Soviet Government is convinced that a decisive demand for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice line would be in the interests of re-establishing peace. We express the hope that the Government of the United States will support the stated demand in the Security Council. We are supporting it.

Everything possible should be done so that positive decision be taken today on this matter by the Security Council.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates it was approved by the President at 8:47 a.m., transmitted by U.S. Molink at 8:57 a.m., and received by Soviet Molink at 8:59 a.m. The message is addressed "To Chairman Kosygin. From President Lyndon B. Johnson." A copy is addressed "Personal from the President to Chairman Kosygin." (Ibid., Rostow Files, President-Kosygin Correspondence) President Johnson met with Rusk, McNamara, Walt Rostow, and George Christian from 8:17 to 9:25 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) There is no record of the meeting. A draft in Rusk's handwriting with Rostow's handwritten revisions is ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, President-Kosygin Correspondence.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The source text is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at 5:50 a.m.; the message was received by the President at 5:50 a.m.; a rough translation was made at 5:54 a.m.; and a final, official translation was provided at 5:23 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 5:34 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 5:43 a.m. (Ibid.)



Washington, June 6, 1967, 10:21 a.m.

Mr. Kosygin,

We continue to believe that the fighting in the Near East should be stopped as soon as possible. We were disappointed that the UN Security Council lost a full day yesterday in its effort to call for a prompt cease-fire. I understand that our representatives in the Security Council will be discussing this matter further this morning. The matter is urgent.

I was puzzled, Mr. Chairman, by what has been said by the Soviet Press and Radio since our exchange of messages yesterday morning. It does not help to charge the United States as a participant in aggression, especially when our only role has been to press for restraint at every step of the way.

I know you are not responsible for Cairo. But you should know that we were astounded that Cairo, just a few hours ago, alleged that U.S. carrier aircraft had participated in attacks on Egypt. This wholly false and obviously invented charge has led to attacks on our representatives in various Arab localities in violation of the most elemental rights of legation. Since you know where our carriers are,<sup>2</sup> I hope you can put Cairo right on this matter and help us eliminate that kind of needless inflammation.

We have expressed to your government our views on the Strait of Tiran in my letter to you of May 28 and Secretary of State Rusk's letter to Foreign Minister Gromyko of the same date.<sup>3</sup>

In this personal exchange I should like to emphasize one point which goes beyond general principles about international rights of passage through narrow waters. President Eisenhower, in 1957, was faced with the problem of obtaining the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai. In pressing for a withdrawal which was earnestly desired by Egypt, President Eisenhower committed the United States to international pas-

sage of the strait. President Nasser's declaration of May 22 that he would close the strait runs squarely into a commitment we undertook while supporting Egypt, quite apart from our interests as a maritime nation.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we both do our best to obtain prompt action by the Security Council. The Resolution, submitted by Ambassador Goldberg to Ambassador Fedorenko last night,<sup>4</sup> meets the points raised in your communication to me, as well as the realities discussed above. We earnestly hope you can give it your support.

For your convenience, the key paragraph in this Resolution is the following:

"Calls upon the Governments concerned to take the necessary measures for an immediate cease-fire and prompt withdrawal, without prejudice to the respective rights, claims or position of anyone, of their armed personnel behind the Armistice Lines, and to take other appropriate measures to ensure disengagement of forces, to refrain from acts of force regardless of their nature, and to reduce tension in the area."

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

<sup>4</sup> Goldberg reported his 9 p.m. meeting with Fedorenko in telegram 5632 from USUN, June 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISRAEL/UN)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation in the source text indicates it was approved by the President at 10:03 a.m.; it was transmitted by US Molink at 10:21 a.m. and it was received by Soviet Molink at 10:43 a.m. The President met with Vice President Humphrey, Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Bundy, Walt Rostow, Clark Clifford, and Llewellyn Thompson from 6:40 to 8:54 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 61037Z from COMSIXTHFLT to CINCUSNAVEUR stated that Soviet ships had been shadowing the U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean constantly since June 2 and could confirm that the U.S. carriers had remained at least 200 miles from Egypt, Syria, and Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East Crisis Files, 1967, Entry 5190)

<sup>3</sup> Documents 88 and 90.

Moscow, June 6, 1967, 6:07 p.m.

Dear Mr. President,

We have considered your proposals. We have issued the necessary instructions to the Soviet Representative in the Security Council. We express the hope that you will also issue corresponding instructions to your representative about the adoption today of resolutions concerning the immediate cessation of military actions with the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice line.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

Washington, June 6, 1967, 8:23 p.m.

Mr. Kosygin:

Our two Ambassadors in the Security Council have been in close consultation throughout the day. We understand that our Ambassadors agreed to a very short resolution calling for a cease-fire as a first step. We authorized our representative to agree on behalf of the United States Government. The Security Council has just adopted this resolution unanimously.<sup>2</sup> We shall do our best to assist the Security Council's further efforts to restore peace in the Near East on a lasting basis.

I trust we can work together in the days ahead to help solve the problems before us in the Near East and elsewhere.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 7:45 p.m., it was transmitted by US Molink at 8:23 p.m., and it was received by Soviet Molink at 8:28 p.m. The President met in the Situation Room from 6:29 to 7:15 p.m. with Rusk, McNamara, Thompson, Katzenbach, Bundy, and Walt Rostow. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Thompson recalled later that during the 8 hours that had elapsed since Johnson's message that morning (Document 175), Fedorenko had agreed to a simple cease-fire, that is, according to Thompson, "to a resolution Kosygin now wanted to get away from." Thompson recalled some discussion in the Situation Room whether they should take advantage of Fedorenko's agreement to a simple cease-fire or stick to the terms of Johnson's earlier message. He thought they would have been prepared to accept the earlier formulation, but everyone agreed they should "take advantage of what had happened in New York." See Document 245.

<sup>2</sup> Resolution 233 (1967); the text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1967, pp. 947-948. The key negotiations at USUN on June 5 and 6 leading to the adoption of the resolution are summarized in telegram 5740 from USUN, June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR/UN)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The source text is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a slight translation was made at 6:12 p.m.; the message was received by the President at 6:15 p.m.; a rough translation was made at 6:17 p.m.; and a final, official translation was provided at 6:38 p.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 6:07 p.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 6:10 p.m. (Ibid.)

Washington, June 7, 1967, 11:18 a.m.

Mr. Chairman:

We are instructing our Ambassador at the United Nations to agree to an immediate meeting of the Security Council when one is suggested by your Ambassador.

Our Ambassador reports that the Security Council was informed last evening by Foreign Minister Eban that Israel would accept a ceasefire, while noting that he did not know of the reaction of the Arab side. He also reported that the Arab Ambassadors were silent on this point. At the time of this message, we ourselves are not clear as to their attitude, with the possible exception of Jordan.

We are taking steps to see that the resolution of the Security Council is implemented by all concerned. We are prepared to work with all others to establish a lasting peace in the region.

The wholly false reports and invented charges that United States aircraft participated in attacks on Egypt have resulted in mob action against American embassies and consulates and a break in Diplomatic relations by seven Arab countries with the United States. This despicable act on their part and failure to give adequate protection to American officials and private citizens in Arab countries will lead to a very serious deterioration in the situation. I repeat the hope that you will be able to counsel moderation where it is needed.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

188. Message From Premier Kosygin to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, June 7, 1967, 8:18 a.m.

Dear Mr. President,

According to available information, Israel is ignoring the Resolution of the Security Council, summoning all governments concerned to take as a first step all measures towards an immediate ceasefire and cessation of all military actions in this area.

Such a situation calls for the Security Council to use its authority to guarantee the implementation of its own decision.

In this connection, we have proposed an immediate reconvening of the Security Council to take effective measures for an immediate cessation of military actions and the re-establishment of peace.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at 8:29 a.m.; the message was received by the President at 8:34 a.m.; a rough translation was made at 8:36 a.m.; and a final official translation was provided at 9:20 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 8:18 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 8:23 a.m. (Ibid.)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates it was approved by the President at 11 a.m.; it was transmitted by US Molink at 11:18 a.m.; and it was received by Soviet Molink at 11:25 a.m. The message was drafted by Rusk and apparently revised by the President, Walt Rostow, and Bundy. A draft marked "Sect. Rusk, 10:10 a.m., draft," along with a copy of the message as sent, which was similar but somewhat revised, is *ibid.*, Country File, USSR, Hollybush, Vol. III. The President met with Walt Rostow and Bundy for a part of the time between 10:25 and 10:45 a.m. discussing "the wording of some communication." *Ibid.*, President's Daily Diary)

Washington, June 7, 1967, 12:05-1 p.m.

## SUBJECT

National Security Council Meeting, Wednesday, June 7, 1967

The following is a record from my notes made during the meeting, but, because of the fast moving events in the Middle East, not transcribed until today.

Secretary Rusk opened the discussion of the situation in the Middle East by reporting that Nasser had suffered a "stunning loss." He had miscalculated the military situation and Soviet support. There was widespread disillusionment with Nasser in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets seemed to have been guilty of encouraging him. The Arabs in the UN felt that the USSR had let them down. Israel was riding high and its demands will be substantial. Israel will probably demand a peace treaty with the Arabs with the following objectives:

- a. Clear resolution of the state of belligerence.
- b. Getting rid of the UN truce supervisory machinery. Israel will accept no arrangements that derogate its sovereignty.
- c. At the beginning it seemed that Israel was not seeking territorial acquisition, but Ambassador Barbour feels they will want Sharm el-Sheikh and straightened out borders.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4. Secret. Dated January 7, 1969. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A list of those present is *ibid.*, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4. A handwritten memorandum, June 7, that Rostow apparently gave to the President during the meeting, conveys a message from Moyers that Eban had told Feinberg he was going to take the position of no withdrawal without a definitive peace, and he would be seeing Goldberg to ask for U.S. support. Feinberg thought this was the way for the President to retrieve his position after the McCloskey statement. (Ibid., Appointment File, June 1967, Middle East Crisis) Rostow evidently received this message in a telephone call from Moyers at 12:28 p.m.; he left the NSC meeting to return Moyers' call. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> At 9 a.m. that morning, Rostow sent the President reports from the London press that Nasser's position was threatened by the developments in the war, with a brief covering memorandum that commented, "If Nasser goes, we indeed do have a new ball game." (Ibid., NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis)

<sup>3</sup> Barbour estimated in telegram 3988 from Tel Aviv, June 7, that the Israelis would insist on final peace treaties with their neighbors with firm, accepted frontiers and would not accept any international supervisory organizations. He thought they would not want to absorb the West Bank but would want to hold on to the areas of the Sinai, including Sharm el-Sheikh, from which they withdrew under pressure in 1957, and that they would expect other adjustments to widen the narrow belt between Jordan and the sea and to improve their strategic position toward Syria. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FOL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Looking ahead, the Secretary spoke of the importance to us of removing belligerent rights, resuming international guarantees, and regional economic and social developments to absorb intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli quarrels. If we do not make ourselves "attorneys for Israel," we cannot recoup our losses. We do have something to bargain with in that Israel must be grateful to the US and Israel requires continuing US support.

The Secretary reviewed the question of "who did what?" He said we had a primary obligation to ourselves to maintain peace. What we would have done had we been in Prime Minister Eshkol's shoes is another question. Eban had laid bare Israeli thinking and we understood it. In any case, the situation on June 8 appeared "more manageable than five days or three days ago." The air battle had been significant.

Mr. Helms said that the Russians had badly miscalculated, even more so than in the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Katzenbach said that arrangements for evacuation of Americans were in progress everywhere except in Jordan. We still were holding off in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Gaud reported that we had had aid programs in six of the fourteen Arab countries (plus Israel)—Sudan, Jordan, Tunisia, the UAR, Morocco, Israel—and a pipeline of one sort or another to twelve. He had stopped obligations to all of these countries. He had frozen everything for those countries who have broken diplomatic relations. In addition there are US contributions to the world food program, UNRWA and voluntary agencies which we had not stopped. The pipeline of unliquidated obligations added up to about \$130 million. The President asked Mr. Rostow to pull all of this information together and to see how it sorted itself out.

With regard to our aid through international or private agencies, Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the JAR, voluntary agency programs might have to give for the time being.

The discussion turned to the question of military equipment. The Vice President said the Congress was watching the flow of arms shipments very carefully. Mr. E.V. Rostow noted Soviet shipments to the Arabs.

The President said "he was not sure we were out of our troubles." He could not visualize the USSR saying it had miscalculated, and then walking away. Our objective should be to "develop as few heroes and as few heels as we can." It is important for everybody to know we are not for aggression. We are sorry this has taken place. We are in as good a position as we could be given the complexities of the situation. We

in smoke very quickly. The President said that by the time we get through with all the festering problems we are going to wish the war had not happened.

Ambassador Thompson said he could figure out no explanation for the Soviet misjudgment. The Russians should have known the Arabs' capability. He felt the end of belligerence should be relatively easy to handle with the USSR. Barring a direct threat to Cairo, he felt the Soviets would probably stay out of war.

Secretary Rusk felt that, in Moscow, those advising caution may be strengthened.

General Wheeler reported briefly on the air war, noting that the Israelis had caught a large portion of the UAR air force on the ground. He also pointed out that the striking nature of the Israeli success reflected great superiority in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline rather than numerical superiority.

The President then went on to read a statement later released to the press (attached),<sup>4</sup> establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council to deal with the Middle East crisis, with McGeorge Bundy to serve as Executive Secretary and as a special consultant to the President and with Secretary Rusk as chairman.

Secretary Fowler discussed briefly the effect of hostilities on the money markets of the world. In sum, he felt there was nothing to indicate any massive movement of funds. He said we were not interfering.

At the President's request for comment, Mr. Bundy said the following about his new assignment. He would be in familiar company and would do his best. He needed the help of people who had been working in the crisis and would require the support of a small staff. He knew his job was primarily to take the best possible advantage of work already going on.

Secretary Rusk concluded by suggesting that there be a meeting of the new committee at 6:30 p.m.

H.H.S.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967*, Book I, p. 599. The President stated that the members of the Special Committee, in addition to Rusk and Bundy, would be Fowler, McNamara, Wheeler, Helms, Clifford, and Walt Rostow. He stated that he would meet with the Committee as necessary, as would Vice President Humphrey and Goldberg.

Washington, June 8, 1967, 10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

It looks as though Kosygin may have contemplated on June 6 sending additional aircraft to Egypt—but he is obviously reluctant and trying to use a cease-fire to avoid that move.<sup>2</sup>

Walt

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis. Top Secret; (code word not declassified).

<sup>2</sup> Rostow's memorandum forwarded [text not declassified] report that [text not declassified] was working on sending aircraft as [text not declassified] had requested. [text not declassified] the Soviet Union would support the Security Council proposal for a cease-fire. [text not declassified] the Soviets were keeping a close watch on the movements of the U.S. and British forces and [text not declassified] U.S. and British aircraft had not taken part in the hostilities.

209. Message From Premier Kosygin to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, June 8, 1967, 9:48 a.m.

Dear Mr. President,

Two days have passed since the Security Council's Resolution concerning the cessation of military actions in the Near East. Facts show that Israel, after the Security Council's appeal, seized considerable territory of the Arab States—United Arab Republic and Jordan—ignoring the Security Council's Resolution. A situation has developed which, in connection with these Israeli actions, demands not simply a cease-fire, but also a withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line. Israel's

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at 10:28 a.m.; the message was received by the President at 10:31 a.m.; a rough translation was made at 10:34 a.m.; and a final, official translation was provided at 12:35 p.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states that it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 9:48 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 10:15 a.m. (Ibid.)

Washington, June 8, 1967, 11:17 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

We have just learned that USS *Liberty*, an auxiliary ship, has apparently been torpedoed by Israel forces in error off Port Said. We have instructed our carrier, *Saratoga*, now in the Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the scene to investigate. We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that proper parties are informed.

We have passed this message to Chernyakov but feel that you should know of this development urgently.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

ions have placed the Arab States in such a situation that they cannot conduct a lawful defensive war against the aggressor, who has challenged the Security Council and all peace-loving states. Until complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territory of the Arab States, in the situation that has developed, re-establishment of peace in the Near East cannot be ensured.

We have instructed the Soviet Representative in the UN to place this question before the Security Council for the adoption of an appropriate resolution.

We would like to express that hope, Mr. President, that you personally and your government will take a position which will respond to the interests of cessation of war in the Near East, and to the interests of peace in the Near East, as you have already stated.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 11 a.m.; transmitted by U.S. Molink at 11:17 a.m.; and received by Soviet Molink at 11:24 a.m. The message was apparently drafted by either Bundy or Walt Rostow in consultation with the President. Bundy telephoned Johnson at 10:20 a.m. and the President returned a call from Walt Rostow at 10:24 a.m. Johnson telephoned Rostow at 11 a.m., and Bundy called him immediately afterward. The President apparently approved the message in one of these conversations. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)



Washington, June 8, 1967, 12:01 p.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

In the light of our understanding of yesterday, we went to all the parties concerned and strongly urged immediate compliance with the cease-fire resolution which had been unanimously agreed in the Council.

The representative of Israel agreed to comply as soon as the other parties also agreed. Of the Arab States, only Jordan agreed to comply; and we are informed that an effective cease-fire is being achieved on that front.

Although we are trying, we doubt that the United States alone can effectively persuade both sides to cease fire.

I instructed Ambassador Goldberg last night to present a resolution today. This resolution calls on all parties in the strongest terms to cease fire immediately.

I am glad to have had your message and have instructed our ambassador in New York to maintain close contact with the ambassador of the Soviet Union and trust you will want to do likewise.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, June 8, 1967, 3:58 p.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

I deeply appreciate your transmitting the message to President Nasser. We lost 10 men, 16 critically wounded, and 65 wounded, as a result of Israeli attack, for which they have apologized.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 3:36 p.m.; transmitted by U.S. Molink at 3:58 p.m.; and received by Soviet Molink at 4 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, May 12-June 19, 1967, Vol. 7. No classification marking. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 11:35 a.m.; transmitted by U.S. Molink at 12:01 p.m.; and received by Soviet Molink at 12:05 p.m. According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with McNamara, Rusk, Clifford, Katzenbach, Thompson, Bundy, and Walt Rostow, from 11:06 to 11:45 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Ibid.)



Moscow, June 8, 1967, 12:20 p.m.

Dear Mr. President,

Your telegram concerning the incident with the American Liberty Type Ship torpedoed near Port Said has been received by us and immediately transmitted for information to President Nasser.<sup>2</sup>

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation." A typed notation indicates a sight translation was made at 12:25 p.m.; the message was received by the President at 12:30 p.m.; a rough translation was made at 12:34 p.m.; and a final, official translation was provided at 1:15 p.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 12:20 p.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 12:23 p.m. (Ibid.) Rostow forwarded the message to the President in a 12:45 p.m. memorandum, commenting that this exchange of messages was "one reason the link was created: to avoid misinterpretation of military moves and incidents during an intense crisis." (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 30) For Ambassador Thompson's comments, see Document 245.

<sup>2</sup> Kohler telephoned Chernyakov at 12:45 p.m. to tell him of the exchange of hot line messages and to thank him for his cooperation. He also noted that Kosygin had described the vessel as a "Liberty-type ship," but that in fact, U.S.S. Liberty was the name of the ship. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

Moscow, June 10, 1967, 8:48 a.m.

Dear Mr. President:

The events of the last days have forced me to express to you with all frankness our view. As the situation shows, the resolutions of the Security Council are invalid. Israel has completely ignored them. As you can understand, after the many attempts taken in this direction and the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the termination of aggression on the part of Israel in the Near East—these attempts have proved ineffective.

A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, to adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these actions may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe. Obviously in the world there are powers to whom this would be advantageous.

We propose that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally ease military action in the next few hours. On our part, we will do the same. We purpose to warn Israel that, if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions will be taken, including military.

Please give me your views.

A. Kosygin

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at 9 a.m. and it was received by the President at 9:05 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 8:48 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 8:52 a.m. (Ibid.)

Moscow, June 10, 1967, 9:44 a.m.

Dear President Johnson,

I have read your reply to our message and I must tell you that your information concerning the cessation of military actions in Syria on the part of Israel is not borne out. We have constant and uninterrupted communications with Damascus. Israel, employing all types of weapons, aviation and artillery, tanks, is conducting an offensive towards Damascus. Obviously your Embassy in Syria can confirm this if you have representatives there. Military actions are intensifying. It is urgently necessary to avoid further bloodshed. The matter cannot be postponed. I request that you employ all your possibilities for the cessation of military actions and the fulfillment of the resolutions of the Security Council for which we both voted.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

246. Message From President Johnson to Premier Kosygin<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 10, 1967, 9:39 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

I have your message. You should know that late last night our Secretary of State sent a most urgent message to Israel to say that we considered it very important that Israel demonstrate by actions on the ground that its orders for a cease-fire are effective.<sup>2</sup> We received assurance at 3 A.M. Washington time that Israel fully intended to achieve actual cease-fire on its side.<sup>3</sup>

Consistent with this assurance, Israelis informed the UN Security Council that its authorities were meeting with General Bull of UN to make all arrangements for cease-fire with Syria.

We have no means of reaching Syrian Government and hope that you have been making similar appeals to them.

Our Ambassador Barbour in Israel has now sent us a message, at 7:45 Washington time, today, saying that Israelis tell him they believe the firing has stopped as of this moment.<sup>4</sup>

We continue to watch developments most closely and will keep in touch with you.

Lyndon B. Johnson

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 9:30 a.m., and transmitted by U.S. Molink at 9:39 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 239.

<sup>3</sup> Document 242.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 4054 from Tel Aviv, June 10; not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FOL 27 ARAB-ISR)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating that a sight translation was made at 10 a.m., and the message was received by the President at 10:05 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 9:44 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 9:52 a.m. (Ibid.)

Washington, June 10, 1967, 10:58 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin,

I have your last message and you can be assured that we have emphasized our position to Israel by every means. We have just restated our views in the strongest terms to Israelis here and in New York and by message to Tel Aviv.

Could you confirm that you have employed your means with the Syrians for this same purpose.

We are taking further steps to inform ourselves on the present situation in Damascus, through several sources, although we have categorical assurances from Israelis that there is no Israeli advance on Damascus.

You will have seen that President Nasser yesterday repeated his outrageous invention about American and British participation in this conflict. Since you know well that this inflammatory charge is a total lie, peace would be served if your Government could publicly state the facts known to you on this point.

You will have learned of the report just made in the Security Council that Israel has informed General Bull it will accept any arrangements for making cease-fire effective on the ground that General Bull's JN representative suggests.<sup>2</sup> Bull himself replied it would take time to contact Damascus. Meanwhile Israel has announced that it regards cease-fire as in effect now. This seems to make it even more urgent that you use your channels to Damascus to ensure that Syrians also stop their fire so as not to provoke further response.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Moscow, June 10, 1967, 11:31 a.m.

Dear Mr. President:

By my instructions, we have just communicated with Damascus. From Damascus we have been informed that military actions are in

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation in the message indicates it was approved by the President at 10:50 a.m., and transmitted by U.S. Molink at 10:58 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> According to Thompson, this information came from the televised proceedings of the Security Council meeting; see Document 245.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. No classification marking. The message is labeled "Translation," with a typed notation indicating a sight translation was made at 11:40 a.m., and the message was received by the President at 11:43 a.m. A typed notation on a copy of the message in Russian states it was transmitted by Soviet Molink at 11:31 a.m. and received by U.S. Molink at 11:34 a.m. (Ibid.)

progress in the vicinity of the city of Kuneitra where Israeli troops continue their offensive operations.

I can assure you that we did everything possible on our part to stop the war against Syria and the UAR. If today all military actions are concluded, it will be necessary to proceed to the next step of evacuating the territory occupied by Israel and the return of troops behind the armistice line.

I consider that we should maintain contact with you on this matter.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

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155. Message From President Johnson to Premier Kosygin<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 10, 1967, 11:58 a.m.

Dear Mr. Kosygin:

I have your last message.

It now appears that military action in the Middle East is being concluded. I hope our efforts in the days ahead can be devoted to the achievement of lasting peace throughout the world.

Respectfully,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, JSSP, Washington-Moscow "Hot-Line" Exchange, 6/5-10/67. Secret. A typed notation on the message indicates it was approved by the President at 11:54 a.m.; transmitted by J.S. Molink at 11:58 a. m.; and received by Soviet Molink at 11:59 a.m.

